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This PRIF Report is a joint policy paper written by members of the research network “External Democ-
racy Promotion” (EDP Network), which is currently funded by the Leibniz Association and coordinated 
at PRIF. All network members have weighed in to share their specific expertise on the current state of 
democracy promotion either in terms of particularly relevant contexts or in terms of important actors 
and regions. 
For quite some time now, academia and policy circles have debated what has been termed a dem-
ocratic recession and a backlash against democracy promotion, while mutterings of the end of Fran-
cis Fukuyama’s “end of history” have resonated widely. Recent events, including the election of Don-
ald Trump as the president of the United States, the rise of illiberal rightwing forces across Europe, 
and political developments in major Southern democracies such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, 
have only exacerbated this pessimistic mood. However, many established practices of international 
democracy promotion up to now continue relatively unscathed by these trends. Where do we current-
ly stand, in terms of democracy promotion in general in today’s world, with regard to traditional key 
promoters such as the European Union and the United States, as well as with regard to those regions 
that have been the main recipients of democracy promotion? And what do recent developments 
mean, we wonder, for the field of study that we have devoted so much work to? This report aims at 
giving a concise and pointed overview of the key trends and challenges that characterize the field of 
international democracy promotion – in the hope of providing perspective and offering points of re-
flection for practitioners, academics and all those interested in the global state and future of democ-
racy. It is based on the research that network members have been conducting, both individually and 
collectively, as well as on the many discussions that we have had at our regular network meetings.
The introduction to the report outlines current trends and challenges that democracy promotion 
policy is confronted with, and it offers general recommendations for dealing with these challenges 
based on the following chapters, which analyze contextual factors, actors, and regions. The second 
chapter reflects upon the current debate on trends towards autocratization and democratic backslid-
ing and reminds us that, while a gradual decline in civil liberties and the rule of law is indeed worri-
some, no broader trend of a decline of democracy can be detected. A third chapter further explores 
the disconcerting trends subsumed under the term “shrinking civic spaces.” It concludes that, while 
the operational response to the manifold restrictions on civil society space has been somewhat suc-
cessful, external democracy promoters have not yet adequately dealt with the normative challenges 
nor developed a coherent political response. A fourth chapter finds that functional cooperation might 
serve as a long-term and rather subtle strategy for indirectly promoting democracy but is indeed beset 
by problems similar to those that more traditional forms of direct democracy promotion are facing.
The following two chapters explore the European Union and the United States, the two most im-
portant traditional governmental democracy promoters. In analyzing where they currently stand and 
what can and should be expected of them, the chapters show that the goal of democracy promotion 
has further lost significance on the respective foreign policy agendas and it is not clear to what extent 
policymakers have the will and the ability to resuscitate it in the medium to long term. The final four 
chapters look at four world regions where democracy promotion has been an important factor during 
the last two decades: the Arab World, Sub-Saharan Africa, post-Soviet countries, and Latin America. 
Summary
These regions have all been affected, to differing degrees, by the challenges democracy promotion 
is facing (outlined below and in the introduction). The authors agree that the loss of credibility of 
democracy promoters is palpable across the board and is often accompanied by a diminished will 
and ability to pursue democracy promotion which needs to be addressed. The authors’ assessments 
of how best to respond to the lack of successful democracy promotion in the respective regions, 
however, differ. The responses discussed here are diverse and range across focusing on democratic 
essentials only, a preference for functional cooperation, a focus on prioritizing bottom-up strategies, 
to a more assertive normative positioning of donor countries.
In sum, the report shows that there is no need to be alarmist. Democracy is certainly in crisis in 
many countries around the world and, overall, negative trends have clearly outweighed positive ones 
in the last decade; but the breakdown of democratic regimes is still a relatively rare phenomenon, 
and the end of democracy as we know it is not in sight. Similarly, despite the backlash and retreat, 
international democracy promotion is (still) characterized by important continuities – and is, thus, for 
the time being here to stay. Still, the analyses collected in this report do reveal substantial problems 
that call for significant adjustments to the established conceptualization and practice of internation-
al democracy promotion. 
In sum, we show that international democracy promotion is currently challenged:
 – On the ‘donor’ side:
– by a lack of credibility
– by a lack of political will and leverage
 – On the ‘recipient’ side:
– by increasing resistance (e.g. against external interference) and/or lack of political will
– by a lack of capacity (e.g., in the contexts of fragile states, regime hybridity and/or violent
 conflicts)
 – In the global context:
– by competing actors that reduce the leverage of democracy promoters
– by a reduced legitimacy/attractiveness of democracy as a model/template for political 
 development
Responding adequately to these challenges is clearly not easy. General recommendations in light of 
the more specific challenges that the chapters address are summarized in the introduction and include 
the following: There is a need for donors and scholars alike to reconceptualize international democracy 
promotion as a reflexive and interactive practice which allows for actual space to debate and negoti-
ate between all relevant stakeholders. For the purpose of finding the most suitable approach in each 
concrete case, democracy promoters need to pay more attention to careful context-sensitive analyses. 
In terms of their own role in this policy endeavor, democracy promoters should try to rebuild their lost 
credibility and restore the power of their example as democracies. Finally, they also need to respond 
better to recent trends, such as new forms of civic activism, and align their policies accordingly.
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1. DemoCraCy promotIon In the 21St Century
Annika E. Poppe, Solveig Richter and Jonas Wolff
1.1 THE CURRENT SITUATION: DISSOLUTION OF CERTAINTIES ABOUT DEMOCRACY    
 PROMOTION
In recent years, we have witnessed a number of global developments that bode ill for international 
democracy promotion – a policy that arguably enjoyed its heyday in the 1990s and became a key 
concern for many established democracies and international organizations. Since the mid-2000s, 
scholars have started to observe a global democratic recession and a backlash against democracy 
promotion. In the meantime, the situation has not improved, to say the least: in both academia and 
policy circles, current debates center on the rise of assertive autocracies and the diffusion and coop-
eration of authoritarian regimes, analyze the global wave of restrictions on civil society organizations 
and international civil society support (“closing/shrinking space”, see Poppe/Wolff in this report), and 
discuss the increasingly worrying trends of political polarization, backsliding and democratic erosion 
even in supposedly consolidated democracies, including in the United States and within the European 
Union (see Gerschewski in this report). At the same time, global assessments of the state of democ-
racy in the world show that there is not an outright wave of autocratization: in quite a few countries 
we can still observe democratic progress, and all around the world there are certainly people strug-
gling for democracy and human rights. On balance, however, international democracy promotion not 
only faces serious challenges and outright resistance in those countries that are on the receiving 
end, but is simultaneously undermined by serious problems on the side of key democracy promoters. 
Against this background, this PRIF report takes stock of key challenges and trends in interna-
tional democracy promotion with an emphasis on the two key governmental actors in democracy 
promotion and the traditional world regions receiving democracy aid. The overall question is where 
the policy of democracy promotion is headed in the future – if anywhere: what form can and should 
adequate responses take in light of the changed circumstances? Three challenges and how they are 
dealt with are particularly relevant in this regard:
(1) Challenged legitimacy of democracy and its promotion
Even if public opinion polls suggest that, broadly speaking, democracy is still the preferred form of 
government for a majority of people in most countries around the world, the specific model of liberal 
democracy has lost appeal for citizens governed by authoritarian as well as democratic regimes, and 
explicitly non-democratic ideas are also on the rise.1 A number of factors have contributed to this. 
Whereas democracy was once equated with economic success and prosperity, political stability, and 
a high level of human rights standards, recent developments have highlighted how even established 
1   See, e.g., Pew Research Center 2017: Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democra-
cy. But many also endorse nondemocratic alternatives, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/2/2017/10/17102729/Pew-Research-Center_Democracy-Report_2017.10.16.pdf.
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democracies are struggling. The world economic crisis has severely shaken the foundations of dem-
ocratic states, while some authoritarian states, most notably China, continue to thrive economical-
ly. Resurgent right-wing movements and successful attempts at dismantling important elements of 
liberal democratic frameworks in the United States as well as some European countries have sullied 
the image of democracy. The European Union’s handling of, first, the crisis of the Eurozone and, 
then, the so-called recent ‘migration crisis’ has further contributed to diminishing its power as a role 
model. Two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq supposedly fought in the name of democracy by the United 
States and its allies have significantly undermined the legitimacy of democracy promotion as an in-
ternational practice. A long-held assumption, albeit always controversial, is now severely and openly 
contested: This is the assumption that there are established democratic regimes that respect high 
democratic standards at home and are therefore able and normatively entitled to support countries 
on their path of “catch-up development.” In fact, the phenomenon of democratic contestation and 
erosion “at home” suggests that democracy-promoting countries are themselves increasingly worth-
while “targets” of democracy promotion.
(2) Diminished political will and political leverage on the donor side 
The increasing struggle over, if not erosion of, democracy within many established democracies is 
combining at the international level with the much-discussed return of geopolitics and hard power. As 
a result, formerly active donor countries have become less enthusiastic. Their attention has turned 
away from promoting democracy and human rights, as many established democracies – even more 
than previously – give priority to other foreign policy and development goals and interests such as 
stabilization. Moreover, to the extent that state actors are still engaged on behalf of democracy, they 
are often faced with competing actors who offer engagement (investments, aid, economic partner-
ship) with no political strings attached. China, again, is the most notable case in this regard. Overall, 
the credibility, the normative appeal, and the ability as well as political will of self-declared democracy 
promoters have clearly diminished (see Grimm and Poppe in this report). 
(3) Increasing skepticism, contestation, and resistance on the recipient side
On the other side of the equation, lately “recipients” too have turned their backs on democracy pro-
motion. Across all world regions, countries that had previously welcomed or at least tacitly accepted 
international democracy promotion are no longer willing to do so. This “pushback” against democra-
cy promotion, which can be observed in around 60 countries, is probably here to stay – it constitutes 
the “new normal” (see Poppe/Wolff in this report).2 As a result, while democracy promotion is needed 
more than ever from a normative standpoint, there are fewer and fewer places where it is welcome. 
Moreover, even in places where that is still the case, liberal democracy, as the long-presumed almost 
universal template upon which democracy promotion policy is based, often encounters significant 
degrees of contestation. As scholars have reminded us recently, democracy is an essentially contest-
ed concept – and, going further, this contestability is of key relevance when it comes to designing 
2   Thomas Carothers/Saskia Brechenmacher 2014: Closing Space. Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire, 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31.
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and implementing democracy promotion policies.3 This means that liberal democracy understood as 
“constitutional, representative, individualistic, voluntaristic, privatistic, functionally limited, political 
democracy as practiced within nation-states”4 no longer offers a relatively clear-cut, hegemonic tem-
plate that can, basically, be taken for granted as the conceptual basis for democracy promotion. It 
has become obvious that democracy cannot simply be promoted but has to be negotiated, including 
at the very basic level of fundamental normative premises and moral beliefs.
In light of these challenges, the promotion of democracy as a strategy and an instrument of 
foreign and development policy is uncertain. To a previously unknown extent, who should promote 
democracy, where it should be promoted, and what exactly should be promoted are open questions 
— and thus previous core assumptions that have traditionally guided democracy promotion are now 
seriously contested.
1.2 WHAT CAN BE DONE? TOWARDS RECONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
How are democracy promoters responding to these challenges? As the individual contributions to 
this report document, many of the established practices of democracy promotion “on the ground” are 
continuing, in spite of the turmoil surrounding them at the level of national and international politics. 
There are certainly pragmatic adaptations as objectives are redefined and instruments revised, the 
result, mostly, being a shift towards less transformative agendas (that, for instance, aim at “stability” 
or “resilience”). However, such a rather technocratic response is not sufficient in light of the dissolu-
tion of certainties that affect the fundamentals of international democracy promotion. So what can 
be done? In summarizing key recommendations debated in the following chapters this policy report 
identifies four overall guidelines that should be considered when designing democracy promotion 
policies in the 21st century:
(1) Donors and scholars should reconceptualize international democracy promotion as a reflexive 
and interactive practice, in which the very aim itself (that is, democracy) is subject to deliberation and 
negotiation. In line with the Agenda 2030 in general and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 in 
particular, democracy promotion should be conceptualized as a two-way street, in which there are 
no passive “recipients” but only agents whose values and preferences have to be heard and taken 
seriously. This also concerns the very definition of the normative horizon towards which the promo-
tion of “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making” should be working, 
as one of the targets of SDG 16 puts it. Obviously though, this raises the important question of what 
a non-negotiable core of democracy promotion might be and at what point democracy promotion no 
longer deserves the name.
3   Milja Kurki 2013: Democratic Futures: Re-Visioning Democracy Promotion, Abingdon: Routledge.
4   Philippe C. Schmitter: A Sketch of What A ‘Post-Liberal’ Democracy Might Look Like, Fiesole: European University 
Institute (unpublished manuscript), 1–2.
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(2) All democracy promotion efforts need to be based on careful context-sensitive analyses in or-
der to decipher the best-suited approach in each situation. In practice, this will sometimes require, for 
example, a top-down or a bottom-up strategy, sometimes pushing hard and sometimes acquiescing 
to resistance. Moreover, donor governments which strive but regularly fail to follow overall political 
coherence in their bilateral relationships with “recipient” governments should, at a minimum, exam-
ine their foreign policy in light of a do-no-harm standard. 
(3) Democracy promoters should try hard to recuperate the power of the example. While difficult 
to measure, there is little doubt that the attraction of prospering and stable democratic regimes has 
been a key dynamic in the spread of democracy throughout the centuries. Democracies thus need to 
focus seriously on their internal struggles as one part of the strategy for regaining global democrat-
ic momentum. Additionally, in terms of democracy promotion itself, applying military force to help 
spread democracy or using the rhetoric of democracy promotion to justify counterterrorism mea-
sures or military interventions should be out of the question.
(4) Democracy promoters should adjust their policies to align with recent trends. For instance, in 
response to the emergence of “new civic activism,”5 donors should become more flexible in terms 
of funding requirements, less focused on the usual suspects (e.g., capital-based advocacy NGOs) 
and less driven by their own normative and political agendas. Often, low-key, small-scale efforts that 
lay the foundation for democratic developments rather than trying to push directly for democratic 
change are most promising. In this sense, in response to an increasingly difficult context in recipient 
countries, donors should focus on the fundamental basics of democratic rule and shift, if necessary, 
from the goal of democracy promotion to goals that are less politically transformative and, therefore, 
usually also less contested, such as conflict management, mediation, and electoral observation.  
1.3 CHAPTER BY CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Apart from the second chapter, whose purpose is to summarize the much-debated trends of auto-
cratization and democratic backsliding, all chapters first briefly outline the status quo, work out the 
most important challenges, and then offer recommendations in their respective fields. Chapters 2, 3 
and 4 seek to further illuminate important context conditions for democracy promotion. Gerschewski 
shows us that there is no general rise in autocratic regimes, but worrying developments indeed with 
regard to the quality of democratic regimes world-wide in terms of political rights and civil liberties 
(chapter 2). Poppe and Wolff zoom in on one particularly noticeable phenomenon in this regard – the 
global spread of shrinking spaces for civil society actors – and discuss how this affects international 
civil society support (chapter 3). Freyburg looks at a specific strategy of international governance 
assistance that some consider a promising alternative to the direct and explicit promotion of democ-
racy and discusses whether democracy promotion through so called “functional cooperation” might 
be a solution to the current malaise (chapter 4).
5   Richard Youngs (ed.) 2017: Global Civic Activism in Flux, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/03/17/global-civic-activism-in-flux-pub-68301.
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We then turn to the two key actors on the world stage with regard to democracy promotion pol-
icies: the European Union (Grimm, chapter 5) and the United States (Poppe, chapter 6). Both are 
increasingly faced with internal and external obstacles and disincentives for democracy promotion, 
and the EU, so far, has not signaled willingness to fill the gap currently opening in light of US neglect 
of the matter. Finally, network members examine four world regions where democracy promotion has 
been an important factor in relationships with “Northwestern” states during the last two decades: the 
post-Soviet countries (Richter, chapter 7), the Arab world (von Hüllen, chapter 8), Africa (Leininger, 
chapter 9), as well as Latin America (Wolff, chapter 10).
The assessments and recommendations that are made in the individual chapters are not neces-
sarily always in alignment with each other. This is the case because good solutions are contingent 
but also because the EDP Network is itself an example of the fact that both democracy and democra-
cy promotion are contested concepts. In general terms, this report uses “democracy” in line with the 
mainstream concept of liberal, representative democracy, unless explicitly stated otherwise. This is 
not the case because we necessarily all share such a conception, but because this is the way in which 
democracy promotion is conceptualized by the very promoters we are studying. Democracy promo-
tion, in the same vein, is used to encapsulate the set of policies that are explicitly aimed at supporting 
the spread and improvement of democracy, no matter whether they actually do so or not. Having said 
that, when it comes to weighing up policy trade-offs and formulating policy recommendations, the 
normative premises of the respective authors necessarily come into play. This diversity in terms of 
conceptual, methodological and normative approaches and the culture of exchange having emerged 
on that basis is something we consider one of our research network’s strong suits. Moreover, the 
recommendations offered may be original but also sometimes reflect well-known calls that have not 
yet been heeded. It is also important to note that, beyond all due skepticism regarding the policy and 
practice of democracy promotion, we do not wish to see the policy abandoned. We share the hope 
that, while democracy promotion has not (yet) often proven successful in empirical and normative 
terms and while we recognize its many problems, potentially this practice can be(come) a worthwhile 
endeavor improving the lives of many. At the very least, we share the belief that a world in which ac-
tors no longer think about how to promote democracy would certainly not be a better place.
2. autoCratIzatIon anD DemoCratIC baCkSlIDIng: takIng StoCk   
 of a reCent Debate
Johannes Gerschewski
The debate on the current state of democracy in the world centers on two prominent questions. 
First, has the global spread of democracy that characterized the decades from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s given way to a reverse wave of autocratization? Autocratization, in this context, means a 
regime change from a democratic to an autocratic one. The second question focuses on more fine-
grained and small-scale changes. Here, the question is whether we are seeing a global trend towards 
democratic backsliding, a gradual loss of democratic quality. 
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This chapter shows that the empirical evidence does not support the alarming notion of a global 
democratic rollback. When it comes to the issue of gradual democratic backsliding, the picture is 
mixed but certainly worrying: While there does not seem to be a negative trend in the electoral com-
ponent of democracy, most democracy indices report a recent decline that particularly concerns civil 
liberties and the rule of law. This decline is still fairly recent and gradual only, but it clearly suggests a 
break with the positive global trend of previous decades. And, as I argue in the conclusion, this trend 
reversal has important implications for the future of democracy promotion. 
2.1 AUTOCRATIZATION
Democratization processes are usually described in waves.6 These waves are loosely defined as 
a set of transitions from autocratic to democratic regimes that co-occur within a given time span 
and that outnumber reverse regime changes. Huntington distinguished between the long wave of 
democratization between 1826 and 1926 that was followed by a reverse autocratization wave, a sec-
ond democratization wave between 1943 and 1962 that was again followed by a reverse wave, and, 
lastly, the famous third wave of democratization which started in 1974. The result of this third wave 
has been a historically unprecedented rise in the absolute number and relative share of democratic 
regimes in the world that lasted, roughly, until the first years of the 21st century.
In the last one and a half decades, however, observers and scholars have increasingly stated that 
we are seeing a “resurgence of authoritarian states” and a “democratic rollback.” Focusing in particu-
lar on China and Russia, a return of “authoritarian great powers” has been detected, which is seen as 
both representing and further driving a broader trend of authoritarian reversal.7 In fact, Larry Diamond 
identifies 25 cases between 2000 and 2014 in which democratic regimes have actually broken down, 
such as Russia in 2000, Venezuela in 2004, Kenya in 2007, Nicaragua in 2011, the Ukraine in 2012, and 
Turkey or Thailand in 2014.8 So, are we seeing a global regression of democracy that is being driven 
by an autocratic reverse wave?
In answering this question, a study by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz provides a helpful starting 
point.9 In addition to the established concept of a democratic transition, they also explicitly define 
and operationalize autocratic transitions. Their key criterion for differentiating between a democratic 
and an autocratic regime is the existence of direct, reasonably fair and representative, competitive 
elections. Drawing on a comprehensive data set that explicitly measures autocratic and democratic 
transitions, Geddes et al. identify autocratization waves in the 1960s and 1970s in which the number 
of autocratic transitions was double the number of democratic ones. Yet, in the 1990s and the 2000s 
6   Samuel Huntington 1991: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of Okla-
homa Press. 
7   See, among many, Azar Gat 2007: The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers, in: Foreign Affairs 86, June/July, 59–69.
8   Larry Diamond 2015: Facing up to the Democratic Recession, in: Journal of Democracy 26: 1, 141–155.
9   Barbara Geddes/Joseph Wright/Erica Frantz 2014: Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set, 
in: Perspectives on Politics, 12: 2, 313–331. 
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democratic transition significantly outnumbered processes of autocratization. Thus, this study does 
not find any evidence of a global autocratization wave.  
It has to be emphasized that the Geddes et al. data set only covers the years until 2010 and may, 
therefore, miss some recent trends. However, more recent studies of the global state of democracy 
and its evolution over time have come to a similar conclusion: We are simply not observing a net re-
duction in the number of democracies in the world, nor is the global share of democratic regimes or 
the percentage of the world population living in democracies shrinking.10 While the autocratization 
of prominent and also strategically important countries – most notably Turkey under Erdoğan and 
Russia under Putin – might create a different impression, these and other cases of democratic break-
down are counterbalanced by reverse trends in other countries. The prominent cases, as worrying 
as they are, provide a misleading picture on a global scale. The democratic rollback is fragmentary 
and scattered, but there are no signs of a current autocratization wave. In fact, for the time being, de-
mocracy is proving to be more robust and resilient than recent gloomy perspectives indicated. While 
the democracy of today faces many challenges and, without doubt, there is room for improvement, 
democratic regression is a myth. 
2.2 DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
The notion of a crisis of democracy does not necessarily imply an actual wave of democratic break-
downs. According to a more differentiated perspective, what we have witnessed in recent years is 
rather a global trend of democratic backsliding. This term does not imply a change of the system, 
but rather a gradual change within the system. It does not refer to the autocratization of a country, 
but rather to a loss of democratic quality. While remaining democratic in a general sense, political 
regimes may suffer from institutional and behavioral malpractice. Such democratic backsliding may 
lead to a gradual breakdown of democracy (as arguably in the cases of Russia, Turkey, or Venezuela), 
or not (as – for the time being – in Brazil, Hungary, India, or Poland). In the following, I discuss to what 
extent we are currently observing such democratic backsliding. 
Currently, public discussion of democratic backsliding is shaped by the prominent examples men-
tioned above. Recent developments in the United States in which President Trump is violating dem-
ocratic norms, attacking free media, and treating political opponents as illegitimate (and even crimi-
nal) are being discussed in this context (see Poppe in this report). The importance of these cases and 
constant media reporting of these worrying developments have led to pessimistic conclusions about 
the state of democracy. Are these conclusions based on firm ground, or are we only extrapolating an 
apparent trend from prominent cases? 
10  See Freedom House 2018: Democracy in Crisis, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Re-
port_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf; IDEA 2017: The Global State of Democracy. Exploring Democracy’s Resilience, 
Stockholm: International IDEA. https://www.idea.int/gsod/files/IDEA-GSOD-2017-REPORT-EN.pdf; Anna Lührmann 
et al. 2018: State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion?, in: Democratization, published online, DOI: 
10.1080/13510347.2018.1479693.
8 EDP NETWORK
The empirical picture is rather mixed. Systematic comparative studies come to a nuanced result 
when assessing the seeming loss of democratic quality worldwide. When looking at the scope of the 
phenomenon, most leading international datasets agree that recent years have been characterized 
by a remarkable trend reversal. In the ranking of the influential think tank “Freedom House”, 2017 
was “the 12th consecutive year” in which “countries that suffered democratic setbacks outnumbered 
those that registered gains.”11 According to another set (V-Dem), the trend to democratic backsliding 
has also accelerated in recent years, but the number of countries backsliding has remained lower 
than the number of countries with advanced democracies – until 2017, when for the first time since 
1979 these numbers were the same. This trend becomes even more strongly negative when the dif-
ferent sizes of the countries affected are taken into account: In 2017 “democracy has declined in 
countries home to one-third of the world population – or 2.5 billion people.”12 
Yet, it is important to note that the overall decline has remained quite modest and has not affect-
ed all components of democracy equally. First, according to the different rankings, recent losses do 
not imply a return to some distant past but typically mean that the global state of democracy is again 
as “bad” as it was around the turn of the century. Compared to the high hopes and near euphoria that 
culminated in the end-of-history thesis, these developments are worrying. Yet, I warn against prema-
turely overstating this short-term trend. Second, it is declines in specific components of liberal de-
mocracy that are driving the recent trend to democratic backsliding. Notably, existing indices do not 
observe a decline but rather continuity, if not continuing improvements, in the electoral component of 
democracy. Recent losses in democratic quality are mostly seen in the area of civil liberties and the 
rule of law.13 A particularly notable element is the spread of increasing restrictions on the freedom of 
assembly and association (see Poppe/Wolff in this report). 
In sum, we are currently facing a global situation characterized by a more or less short-term and 
modest decline in democratic quality, particularly in the field of civil liberties. This recent trend has 
put a halt to – and has started to reverse – decades of democratic advances. The period of continu-
ous advancement that started in the late 1970s is clearly over and has given way to a new period of 
heightened uncertainty over the state and future of democracy. Yet, it is still too early to say whether 
the world has entered a period of global democratic backsliding, or whether we are rather witnessing 
merely a few years of democratic stagnation. 
2.3 CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION?
What are the consequences and implications of this empirical picture for the future of democracy 
promotion? Today, democracy promotion is facing an enormous challenge. It is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to identify and spot the concrete needs for democracy promotion as the dividing lines 
11   Freedom House 2018 (footnote 10), 1. See also the findings of the most recent Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI 2018) at http://www.bti-project.org.
12   Lührmann et al. 2018 (footnote 10), 1. 
13   See IDEA 2017 (footnote 10); Lührmann et al. 2018 (footnote 10).
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between democratic and autocratic regimes become blurred. In particular, illiberal democracies are 
growing in number. While still maintaining the electoral core of democracies and therefore fulfilling 
minimal definitions of democratic rule, they are gradually undermining political participation rights 
and civil liberties. These regimes rely on formally democratic rules and structures, but are increas-
ingly expressing them in authoritarian practices. This process represents not only a gradual decay 
of democratic quality, but it also involves a very subtle hollowing out. Democracy promotion needs 
to react to this subtlety that often goes unnoticed at the beginning. This need makes in-depth local 
knowledge indispensable. Analytical precision is needed today to stop the ongoing loss of democrat-
ic quality in some countries. As I have shown, from a global and long-term perspective these demo-
cratic backsliding processes are not as dramatic as some comments suggest, and an outright wave 
of autocratization cannot be detected. Yet, democracy promotion clearly faces new challenges. That 
key democracy promoters and former democratic role models like the United States are beginning 
to lose their global credibility and integrity and that the European Union is rightly criticized for double 
standards is making the current situation even more difficult (see Grimm and Poppe in this report).
3. DemoCraCy promotIon anD the Challenge of ShrInkIng CIvIC   
 SpaCeS 
Annika E. Poppe and Jonas Wolff
3.1 STATUS QUO
Over the past 15 years, civil society organizations (CSOs) in many countries all around the world have 
seen their room for maneuver severely reduced. State restrictions that constrain the space of civil so-
ciety range from curtailing the freedoms of assembly and association to restricting access to finan-
cial resources to openly harassing individual CSOs and activists.14 This phenomenon of “shrinking” 
or “closing spaces” is of immediate relevance for democracy promotion efforts. First, the curtailment 
of basic freedoms directly runs counter to any efforts at political liberalization. Second, restrictions 
often specifically target the external support of CSOs. In particular, with the spread of so-called NGO 
laws, many advocacy organizations engaged in politically “sensitive” areas such as human rights and 
democracy have seen their access to foreign funding significantly limited or entirely closed.15
While attempts to constrain civil society activity are certainly not a novelty, the recent trend of in-
creasing restrictions is remarkable, as it concerns countries that have previously been relatively open 
to external democracy promotion. According to different estimates, since the turn of the century, 
14   Thomas Carothers/Saskia Brechenmacher 2014: “Closing Space. Democracy and Human Rights Support under Fire”, 
http://ceip.org/1hBVQKk, 38–39; Douglas Rutzen 2015: Civil Society under Assault, in: Journal of Democracy, 26: 4, 
28–39.
15   Kendra Dupuy/James Ron/Aseem Prakash 2016: “Hands Off My Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid 
to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries”, in: World Development 84, 299–311.
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between 40 and 60 countries have started to actively push back international support for democracy 
and human rights.16 This trend covers countries from all world regions and all regime types. The most 
prominent cases include countries that experienced processes of authoritarianization such as Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Russia, and Venezuela. But increasing restrictions on international civil society support can 
also be observed in democratic regimes such as Ecuador, Hungary, India or Israel. 
3.2 CHALLENGES
The phenomenon of shrinking spaces poses three challenges to those engaged in democracy pro-
motion: as an operational challenge, the question is how democracy can be promoted in contexts of 
shrinking space. The diversity of democracy promoting entities, of actors on the “recipient” side as 
well as of the types of restrictions, make for a large number of different, context-specific operational 
challenges. External democracy promotion actors often face immediate constraints on their own 
work: the delay or denial of visa and residence permits, the flow of already allocated money or their 
activities becoming illegal through new laws, smear campaigns against their work, and sometimes 
even direct threats to the organization or individuals. Occasionally they also face fading support by 
their own governments, which are often concerned about not further alienating a partner government 
on the defensive. But even if external actors still act relatively unrestrainedly, their work is often hin-
dered by restrictions their local partners are confronted with. 
As a political challenge, the question is how democracy promoters can respond politically to shrink-
ing spaces. The regular options for political responses by governments apply, ranging from public or 
quiet diplomacy, to political dialogue, to positive and negative incentives, such as conditional aid or 
sanctions. Many of those governments which have declared democracy promotion to be a key element 
of their foreign policy have, not surprisingly, so far responded hesitantly. Just as these governments 
never went out of their way to promote democracy in other countries – particularly not when this en-
dangered other, more tangible interests – the recent wave of restrictions has not elicited a coherent or 
united response. On the contrary, the majority of governments took a long time to recognize, situate and 
begin to understand the phenomenon. Most responses so far have been limited to political dialogue 
and relatively mild diplomatic pressure. Developing coherent responses has been further complicated 
by the fact that more and more democratic states have themselves provided convenient templates for 
authoritarian states to emulate in this regard. For instance, the US-driven “War on Terror” has served 
as a key justification for increasing state oversight of civil society organizations all around the world.
As a normative challenge, the question is how democracy promotion can be preserved or restored 
as a legitimate type of external interference. Indeed, this might be the (often denied) key insight that 
the phenomenon of shrinking space has brought into sharper relief: promoting democracy in a coun-
try not one’s own is a political act that, even if invited, constitutes external interference. Consequently, 
16   Annika Elena Poppe/Jonas Wolff 2017: The Contested Spaces of Civil Society in a Plural World. Norm Contestation in 
the Debate about Restrictions on International Civil Society Support, in: Contemporary Politics, 23: 4, 469–488, here: 
472.
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the legitimacy of democracy promotion can be – and regularly is – contested. Over the past 15 years, 
governments all over the world have more openly and forcefully questioned the legitimacy of outside 
political activity in their country. And while their motives may indeed often lie in stabilizing their rule 
or in political power plays, their arguments are based on well-established international norms that 
are certainly contested, but are difficult to reject outright: national sovereignty, non-interference and 
self-determination.17 
3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Whereas the operational challenges are being tackled more or less successfully in the daily activities 
of external democracy promoters, the political and normative challenges have turned out to be more 
difficult to deal with.
In terms of operational responses, many democracy promotion actors have already become cre-
ative in their daily work. While local CSOs and their external supporters at times entirely cease their 
activities, in many cases they manage to adapt pragmatically: they shift their work to conform to 
new restrictions or simply rebrand what they are doing, they change legal organizational form and/
or upgrade their security standards. Thus, operational actors, in many cases, already use the room to 
maneuver to the extent that this is still possible. 
For them to go further and rely on political backup a more coherent political response by “donor” 
governments is needed. As noted, this is mostly missing, since these governments are regularly con-
flicted and are restrained by other interests they are pursuing; take the Middle East for example (see 
van Hüllen in this report), where the European response is subdued by the overarching goal of stop-
ping the flow of refugees, and where the United States has long been hesitant due to anti-terrorism 
and other strategic concerns. At a minimum here, governments should realign their foreign policies 
with regard to a do-no-harm approach. This means that, if actively engaging in countering shrinking 
spaces is not a realistic option, governments should at least make sure that they do not – passively 
or inadvertently – contribute to a further deterioration of the situation. 
For governments seeking to actively engage, there are no easy ways to respond politically to 
shrinking spaces. All available strategic options come with risks and trade-offs. When devising coun-
try-specific response strategies, it might be useful to consider the range of options along two axes: 
1. When it comes to dealing with the restrictive context in a given country, democracy promoters 
can either adapt to the existing restrictions or try to change the circumstances and thus resist. 
The first option usually allows for some influence and can help threatened local CSOs to sur-
vive. But accepting the status quo risks bolstering the regime, while limited spaces are perpet-
uated. Resistance stays true to the original cause and may even help create and open spaces, 
17   See Poppe/Wolff 2017 (footnote 16).
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but runs the risk of a counter reaction by the regime that increases threats on local CSOs and/
or renders any international engagement impossible. 
2. When it comes to dealing with the “recipient” actors involved, external actors can choose to focus 
on mediation between the state and CSOs or aim at empowering civil society actors. The former 
can help alleviate tensions but risks further weakening the relative autonomy of the civil society 
sector. The latter offers direct help to weakened CSOs, but can also provoke intensified restric-
tions.18
Democracy support actors need to carefully mix and match these strategies (which are ideal 
types only) – always on the basis of a careful context-sensitive analysis of a given situation and with 
a view to the potentially ambivalent effects of any measures adopted.
Finally, the normative challenge to the endeavor of democracy promotion has yet to be fully rec-
ognized and tackled. Democracy promoting governments have displayed a clear tendency to ignore 
this issue. It might be fair enough in many cases to disqualify justifications by governments that re-
strict civil society space as thinly veiled attempts to weaken the opposition and consolidate power. 
Yet, entirely disregarding the justifications advanced misses the point that the controversy over civil 
society support challenges fundamental norms that guide and legitimate international democracy 
promotion. This normative challenge highlights the fact that these norms are not at all clearly spelled 
out: the legality as well as the legitimacy of external interference in the name of democracy does not 
rest on a sound or coherent footing. This calls for a serious global debate on international norm de-
velopment that has barely begun – as difficult as such a debate will certainly be. 
4. DemoCraCy promotIon by InDIreCt meanS: potentIal anD   
 lImItS of funCtIonal CooperatIon
Tina Freyburg
4.1 STATUS QUO
Widespread consensus has it that democracy promotion through military coercion is not a particularly 
promising strategy. Yet, the notion of promoting democracy in stable authoritarian regimes by coopera-
tive means raises a seemingly intractable problem: why should the incumbent ruler be willing to commit 
what amounts to political suicide by enacting genuine democratic change? Non-coercive instruments 
of democracy promotion, such as political conditionality and assistance to democratic activists, require 
18   Please note that empowering CSOs is not the same as resisting shrinking space, as CSOs may be directly support-
ed with a view to enabling their adaptation to an increasingly restrictive context, just as mediation can be used as a 
strategy to resist the implementation of restrictive measures.
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at least tacit consent on the part of the targeted regime. As outlined in previous chapters, recent years 
have seen a significant decrease in the number of countries in which democracy promoters can count 
on such (tacit) consent. In the current context, therefore, the search for alternatives to direct democracy 
promotion has become more important than ever. In this chapter, I argue that functional cooperation 
with authoritarian regimes offers such an alternative. As I show, research suggests that, by supporting 
the implementation of legal and administrative governance standards in policy sectors outside the key 
areas of democracy promotion, donors can de facto contribute to a gradual transfer of democratic 
norms. Yet, as will be seen, the success of such an indirect approach to promoting democratic change 
depends on preconditions that are being similarly undermined in the current global context.
Functional cooperation, in this context, refers to foreign aid programs and activities that focus 
on specific policy sectors (e.g., water, health, education, energy) with the aim of improving the op-
eration and performance of the public administration in the given sector by promoting legal and ad-
ministrative governance standards. The apparently non-political nature of such sector-specific gov-
ernance programs and their promise to promote the provision of public goods as well as services, 
thereby addressing sources of potential domestic discontent, makes functional cooperation attrac-
tive to authoritarian regimes. This calculation on the part of recipient governments notwithstand-
ing, sector-specific governance programs can actually serve to gradually promote democratic stan-
dards from within the public sector. Functional cooperation brings together government regulators 
to exchange information, develop common regulatory standards, and assist one another in enforcing 
these standards. Having been designed by and for advanced democracies, the template regulations 
embody governance provisions that reflect key democratic principles, notably participatory, transpar-
ent, and accountable modes of administrative decision-making.19 By participating in externally sup-
ported policy reform programs, state officials from non-democracies can become acquainted with 
democratic governance.20 Insofar as partner countries approximate their domestic legislation to the 
template regulation provided, democratic provisions can also enter domestic legislation if not shape 
administrative practices in non-democracies. Evidence in support of such a democratizing potential 
of functional cooperation has been found in studies of various EU Neighbourhood policy initiatives.21 
Similar programs of sectoral reform are, however, also applied by external actors other than the EU, 
including the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation, and the UN Development Programme, and can also happen within transgovernmen-
tal networks such as the International Competition Network. 
By itself, functional cooperation is certainly unlikely to engender more profound democratic 
change, and it can even have the opposite effect when the stabilization of a given authoritarian re-
gime through improved public sector performance outweighs the above-mentioned pro-democratic 
19   Derick Brinkerhoff 2000: Democratic Governance and Sectoral Policy Reform: Tracing Linkages and Exploring Syner-
gies, in: World Development, 28: 4, 601–615.
20   Tina Freyburg 2015: Transgovernmental Networks as an Apprenticeship in Democracy? Socialization into Democratic 
Governance Through Cross-national Activities, in: International Studies Quarterly, 59: 1, 59–71.
21   Tina Freyburg et al. 2015: EU Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its Neigh-
bourhood, Palgrave. 
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effects (see van Hüllen in this report). Yet, at least potentially, this low-key, depoliticized, and techno-
cratic way of transferring democratic principles and practices can play an important role in preparing 
the (legal) administrative ground upon which eventual political transitions can rest.22 Functional co-
operation might thus contribute – albeit indirectly, and only partially – to the goal of democratization. 
4.2 CHALLENGES
Sector-specific governance programs generally operate without much publicity and are relatively un-
affected by the turbulences of political dispute. In most cases, they are actively sought by regimes 
that see them as unthreatening and offering additional resources to boost their capacity to imple-
ment public policies. The cooperative character of such indirect democracy promotion activities 
makes them a promising venue even in (semi-)authoritarian contexts. At the same time, because 
they depend on being perceived as non-political, these sector governance programs can realize their 
democratizing potential only in relatively non-politicized settings. While generally better suited for 
supporting democracy in unfavorable contexts, in light of amplified politicization and geopolitical 
hardening of relations, this indirect strategy of democracy promotion is increasingly being confront-
ed with the same challenges straightforward policies of democracy promotion are facing.23
First, a (semi-)authoritarian regime needs to perceive participation in sector-specific reform pro-
grams to be beneficial. It needs to be convinced that it can find better solutions to its specific policy 
problems by cooperating with established democracies than by developing independent solutions or by 
looking for assistance elsewhere. The larger its own resources and the wider the spectrum of alterna-
tive solutions and partners, the smaller the chance that it will adopt rules and standards originating in 
developed democracies given their potentially costly political implications (i.e., precisely the provisions 
of democratic governance incorporated in them). While liberal democracies still have the greatest tech-
nological and economic resources to invest in development elsewhere, regional authoritarian powers 
such as Saudi Arabia and China have started to conceive their foreign relations in broader terms. Part of 
their strategy consists in participating more substantially in development aid. What distinguishes their 
approach from “traditional” development cooperation as practiced by liberal democracies is that the 
latter tend to make assistance conditional on politico-economic criteria, while the former set no condi-
tions of this kind, which makes them interesting partners for authoritarian regimes.24
Second, targeted countries may feel more pressure to harmonize their rules and practices with 
an externally-supported standard if this standard enjoys broad international legitimacy, i.e. if it is 
22   Tatiana Zaharchenko/Gretta Goldenman 2004: Accountability in Governance: The Challenge of Implementing the 
Aargus Convention in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, in: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 4, 229–251. 
23   Tina Freyburg/Sandra Lavenex 2018: Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation, in: Tobias Schumacher/An-
dreas Marchetti/Thomas Demmelhuber (eds.): Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, Rout-
ledge.
24   Tina Freyburg/Solveig Richter 2015: Local Actors in the Driver’s Seat: Transatlantic Democracy Promotion under Re-
gime Competition in the Arab World, in: Democratization 22: 3, 496–518.
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recognized and applied by the international community. There are trends that make the stability of 
international norms in the near future less certain. Our rules-based world is crumbling under pres-
sures of globalization that seem to be giving birth to a return of geopolitics. This, in turn, may hamper 
longer-term relationships between democracies and non-democracies; practices of cross-national 
sectoral cooperation may suffer a setback. The loss in credibility, leverage and political will on the 
part of established democracies outlined in the introduction to this report adds to this.
Third, whether or not a regime is willing to adopt and apply rules originating in liberal democracies 
depends on its own degree of liberalization. Regimes that risk excessively high political costs related 
to the adoption of rules fostering issue-specific transparency, accountability, and participation are 
likely to engage only hesitantly in functional cooperation with democracies. For instance, govern-
ments that have difficulty in maintaining control over their country and/or that struggle with (per-
ceived) terrorist threats will probably remove the democratic components of a governance reform or 
renounce the reform program altogether. This scenario has become more common, for instance, in 
the countries surrounding the EU, such as Egypt.  
Finally, even when functional cooperation is successful in transferring certain norms, there is no 
automatic spill-over from rule adoption to rule application. Provisions of democratic governance in-
corporated in sectoral rules may be adopted by a recipient country as part of its strategy for address-
ing a specific policy challenge, but not implemented – due to the anticipated high political costs of 
application or because of the instability (or lack) of effective government. To be sure, an increase in 
democratic governance is no real substitute for democratic transformation proper. Rules pertaining 
to transparency provisions in environmental legislation or to independent judicial review in asylum 
policy, for instance, are only small drops in the ocean of institutional provisions constituting a dem-
ocratic order. Still, if included in domestic legislation, provisions of democratic governance can con-
stitute a domestically legitimized point of reference for reform-minded agents that may demand their 
realization in practice. 
4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Indirect democracy promotion by means of functional cooperation with (semi-)authoritarian regimes 
can be effective, but only in a context of cooperative relations between the actors involved. Even 
then, it can only promote acquaintance with democratic attitudes and practices through long-term 
relationships marked by sufficient trust to allow the necessary leeway and openness. This requires a 
mutual commitment to rule-based bilateral relations and the renunciation on the part of the would-be 
democracy promoter of ad-hoc, arbitrary actions that undermine the very principles on which func-
tional cooperation is based. Confrontation and “hard” policies that aim at coercing (semi-) authoritar-
ian regimes are, thus, incompatible with indirect democracy promotion through functional coopera-
tion; policy-specific reform programs bringing together state administrations from democracies and 
non-democracies in order to work on common policy challenges are to be protected and extended. 
Finally, to ensure that autocratic states continue to associate benefits with cooperation with more 
developed democracies, liberal democracies need to refrain from protectionist policies and reduced 
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international commitments. Maintaining development cooperation with an attitude of openness to-
ward (semi-)authoritarian and quasi-democratic countries is fundamental for the support of indirect 
efforts at promoting gradual processes of democratization.
5. DemoCraCy promotIon anD the european unIon
Sonja Grimm
5.1 STATUS QUO 
Since its foundation, the EU has been a community of values of liberal democracies. This ‘democra-
cy consensus’ informs EU democracy promotion (DP), especially EU enlargement policy, as its most 
comprehensive foreign policy framework. In 1993, the Copenhagen Council opened a membership 
perspective for all associated Central and Eastern European countries – on the condition that they 
became functioning democracies and market economies capable of applying the EU body of law. The 
EU rewarded compliance with financial and technical assistance, the opening of accession negotia-
tions and, ultimately, membership. 
Accession conditionality has also inspired the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards 
the Eastern and Southern neighbors and the EU development cooperation policy towards developing 
countries worldwide, where partner countries do not have a membership perspective. Here, progress 
in democratization is rewarded with the provision of technical or financial assistance, economic or 
security partnerships or visa liberalization.
Three main features characterize overall EU DP. First, it is top-down-oriented. The EU directly ne-
gotiates the conditions of cooperation with partner country governments and their line ministries. 
Assistance is given to state actors. Through the European Instrument of Democracy and Human 
Rights and the European Endowment for Democracy, a complementary bottom-up strategy support-
ing civil society has been implemented, but plays only a minor role in the Union’s total aid spending. 
Second, the EU prefers an indirect approach to DP over a direct approach. Most of the EU’s financial 
assistance is dedicated to socio-economic development and the technical side of state building sup-
porting democratization indirectly via modernization, whereas direct DP for the building of democrat-
ic institutions and the rule of law receives only a minor share. Third, EU DP sequences security first, 
democracy second. Especially in post-conflict or fragile contexts, the EU gives money to the building 
of security and stabilization before investing in democratic institution building.25
25  Sonja Grimm/Okka Lou Mathis 2015: Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third: The European Union’s 
Policy towards Post-Conflict Western Balkans 1991–2010, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 67: 6, 916–947.
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5.2 CHALLENGES
Currently, the Union’s DP is confronted with four major challenges: first, EU DP loses credibility as 
a consequence of illiberal internal tendencies in member countries. In several member states, right 
wing populist parties have won a substantial share of seats in national legislatures (e.g. Belgium, 
Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, UK, and most recently, Germany), or have even suc-
cessfully campaigned for office in the political executive (e.g. France, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy). 
Their success can partly be explained by increasing skepticism inside the member states’ elector-
ates in connection with European integration, its bureaucratic shape, its seeming lack of democratic 
accountability and its strong focus on economic austerity (e.g. its handling of the Eurozone crisis 
in Greece, Italy and Spain). Additionally, the so called “refugee crisis” of 2015 revealed double stan-
dards. While openly criticizing authoritarianization in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Russia, and 
Venezuela, the demolition of democracy in Turkey after the 16 July 2016 coup d’état was only mod-
erately criticized, in order not to endanger the EU-Turkey refugee deal of 18 March 2016.26 These 
developments question whether the EU democracy consensus still exists, and whether the Union is 
able and willing to defend and promote democracy when security or economy interests are at stake.
Second, the three main EU DP strategies (top-down, indirect, security before democracy) lack 
effectiveness and need a substantial overhaul. The EU’s top-down strategy frequently implies coop-
eration with corrupt governments which have limited capacity, willingness or room to maneuver in 
order to implement democracy and rule of law reforms. While international aid donors favor “going 
local” in aid giving, the EU is not well prepared to deal directly with pro-democracy actors which might 
drive political reform processes. Although it seeks to achieve the opposite, because of the challenge 
of harmonizing the interests of three EU institutions (Commission, Council, Parliament) and 28 mem-
ber states, the EU is losing its grip on the outcomes of reform in non-democratic partner countries.27
The indirect approach to DP does not efficiently advance democratization either. The indirect 
approach is favored because it is perceived as being less politicized than the direct approach and 
circumvents direct interference in the domestic political affairs of a partner country. However, the 
long-term effects of socio-economic development on democracy are too moderate and faintheart-
ed to substantially advance democratic institution building and to support pro-democracy actors in 
non-democracies. Even in the potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans, to give an exam-
ple, indirect EU DP does not yield the intended result of rising democratic quality.28 On the other hand, 
a direct approach to DP requires that the EU interferes more openly and directly in domestic state 
affairs, for example through the support of political-party building or the establishment of free media. 
Such a strategy would hardly be justifiable either inside or outside the EU. 
26  European Commission, Press Release, 19 March 2016, www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_de.htm.
27  Sonja Grimm 2015: European Democracy Promotion in Crisis: Conflicts of Objectives, Neglected External– Domestic 
Interactions and the Authoritarian Backlash, in: Global Policy, 6: 1, 73–82.
28   Sonja Grimm/Okka Lou Mathis 2018: Democratization via Aid? The European Union’s Democracy Promotion in the 
Western Balkans 1994–2010, in: European Union Politics, 19: 1, 163–184.
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Prioritizing security and stabilization over institution building negatively affects the highly 
sought-after outcome of socio-economic development. Security and stability are promoted at the ex-
pense of institution-building; but without effective institutions and capable governments, sustainable 
socio-economic development cannot be achieved. Hence, a lack of good governance also negatively 
affects socio-economic development, as can be observed, for example, in the EU’s African partner 
countries (see van Hüllen and Leininger in this report) and also in the post-soviet space (see Richter 
in this report).
Third, the EU is not ready (or is unwilling?) to respond meaningfully to political developments in 
partner countries, neither to democratic setbacks nor to pro-democratic windows of opportunity. If 
partner countries do not comply with the Union’s membership or political conditions, but severely 
violate human rights, the EU, rarely if ever, punishes such behavior through the reduction or total with-
drawal of aid.29 A case in point is Tunisia under then President Ben Ali. The country became a major 
beneficiary of EU funds despite its grim human rights record because it liberalized its market along 
EU lines and co-operated with the security services of some EU member states in the fight against 
terrorism.30 But also when chances for democratization are good, the EU rarely changes its neigh-
borhood approach. The 2011/2012 Arab spring and the reluctant European responses to the popular 
uprisings are a case in point (see van Hüllen in this report).
Fourth, EU DP is at odds with regional powers’ countervailing EU DP policies, for example Russia 
in the former Soviet space, China in Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa or Saudi Arabia in Northern Africa. 
These new players in economic and development cooperation make offers without tying them to po-
litical conditions. At present, findings on how these activities are affecting the impact of EU and US 
DP are inconclusive.31
Considering that under US-President Trump, the credibility of the US as a model democracy (pro-
moter) has sunk to a low point (see Poppe in this report), it is questionable whether the US adminis-
tration still is (and will continue to be) a reliable partner in global DP and whether the EU and the US 
can jointly exert sufficient leverage on authoritarian incumbents.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
To deal with these challenges, the EU needs to intensify its efforts to coordinate democracy promo-
tion with and among its members as well as with other regional and international organizations. Co-
ordination of conditions and sanctions efficiently increases compliance of partner countries with EU 
29   Bernhard Reinsberg 2015: Foreign Aid Responses to Political Liberalization, in: World Development, 75: 1, 46–61.
30   Raffaella A. Sarto 2016: Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 54: 2, 215–232.
31   Sonja Grimm 2015: European Democracy Promotion in Crisis: Conflicts of Objectives, Neglected External– Domestic 
Interactions and the Authoritarian Backlash, in: Global Policy, 6: 1, 73–82.
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY 19
conditions. The EU should make more open use of its normative power and proactively take the lead 
in the development and practice of global DP. 
The EU should complement its favored top-down approach to DP more consequently with a bet-
ter-funded bottom-up approach. A substantial strengthening of the bottom-up instruments of EIDHR 
and EED would support civil society activism and prevent further shrinking of the public space. For 
alternative recipients inside the civil society, EU DP should become less technocratic, and the EU 
should strive to increase its DP assistance outreach beyond the usual recipients of DP. The EU should 
also develop quicker reaction mechanisms to human rights violations and democratic setbacks in 
order to make its DP instruments more efficient and to increase its credibility as a global norm entre-
preneur in the name of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Finally, the EU should practice 
what it preaches: focus on fundamental basics of democratic rule and accountability, and take this 
seriously, both in DP towards partner countries and in its integration policies towards the member 
states. To increase the likelihood of stabilization and socio-economic development, the EU should 
more directly invest in and foster democratic institution-building, inside and outside its borders.
6. DemoCraCy promotIon unDer the Current uS aDmInIStratIon
Annika E. Poppe
6.1 STATUS QUO
Democracy promotion has been at the core of US foreign policy strategy since the end of the Cold 
War, when it became a cornerstone of the National Security Strategy. Democracy promotion, accord-
ing to the widely shared and regularly articulated conviction in the foreign policy elite, would bring 
numerous economic, security, and normative benefits for everyone involved and is also the morally 
right thing to do. While the (until recently) unquestioned rhetorical commitment to democracy pro-
motion delimits what is considered normatively appropriate foreign policy behavior for the declared 
‘champion of democracy’ and while this policy has an important function for generating consensus 
and affirming national identity, democracy promotion practice has always lagged far behind the rhet-
oric.32 After over one year in office, it has become clear that presidential candidate Trump’s lack of 
interest in and disdain for democracy promotion has indeed persisted in office. His secretaries of 
state so far have also not been inclined to assume leadership on behalf of democracy. Considering 
that President Trump has vowed to cut democracy promotion efforts on all fronts, the signs point 
towards significant changes to democracy promotion strategically and operationally. In terms of bud-
getary changes, for example, Trump has attempted significant cutbacks – which have, however, so 
32   Annika E. Poppe 2010: Whither to, Obama? U.S. Democracy Promotion after the Cold War, PRIF Report No. 96, Frank-
furt/M, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif96.pdf
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far been successfully averted by Congress.33 And while he has already severely damaged US credi-
bility as ‘democracy promoter in chief,’ it is not yet clear how much the overall policy, which is borne 
by numerous agencies and actors inside and outside the government (‘US democracy promotion 
industry’), will be affected.  
6.2 CHALLENGES
It is certainly not the Trump administration that is responsible for the trouble that US democracy pro-
motion is in. US democracy promotion has been challenged on different fronts for two decades now. 
Beyond the challenges identified in the introduction to this report, two things need to be considered 
for the United States specifically: (1) US credibility as the democracy promoter on the world stage 
has suffered severely over the past two decades. Selective and often halfhearted engagement for 
democracy abroad as well as President Bush’s labeling of US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
as democracy promotion have tarnished the policy in the eyes of many observers. Perhaps just as 
important, internal developments – the curtailment of basic rights, the use of torture, the sometimes 
chaotic US political process that puts democratic institutions in doubt – have contributed to a dim-
ming of the American torch of democracy. Moreover, (2) isolationist tendencies, always simmering in 
the background in the political process, as well as the notion that democracy promotion is irrelevant 
for US “hard interests” has found a new outlet in the Trump administration. 
President Trump is deepening these troubles but, overall, his administration should be viewed 
less as a cause but more as a symptom of the problems democracy (promotion) is facing. From 
the perspective of those favoring active engagement on behalf of democracy worldwide, the list of 
grievances is long: from the beginning of his candidacy, Trump has questioned the premises of de-
mocracy promotion that have reliably shaped US post-Cold War thinking on this policy. Most promi-
nently, Trump criticized US foreign policy as being based on “the dangerous idea that we could make 
Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western de-
mocracy,” thus giving rise to a policy that was arrogant, illogical, and has contributed to strengthening 
ISIS.34 Highly unconventional for an American president (to be), Trump openly questioned democra-
cy’s universal appeal.35 He also repeatedly pointed out that the United States was a bad messenger 
as its own democracy had derailed.36 It was no surprise then when the president, once in office, made 
no senior-level appointments of people with a clear pro-democracy record, or when he and his Sec-
retary of State tried to slash the budget for democracy and governance – so far with little success.37
33  Andrew Miller/Todd Ruffner 2018: President Trump’s Second Foreign Affairs Budget, POMED Report June 2018, 
https://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BudgetReportFY19_Digital.pdf.
34   “Trump on Foreign Policy”, 27 April 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-foreign-policy-15960?page=show.
35  “Trump fires up crowd with attack on Clinton’s ‘disqualifying conduct”, 6 September 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2016/sep/06/donald-trump-rally-greenville-north-carolina-clinton-attack.
36   “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and the World”, 21 July 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html.
37  See Miller/Ruffner 2018 (footnote 33).
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Trump clearly represents a low point for US credibility on the matter of democracy. His openly 
expressed doubts about democratic institutions, his hesitance in unequivocally distancing himself 
from violence, his attacks on independent media, and his willing and open (rhetorical) embrace of au-
thoritarian leaders have yielded comparisons with an authoritarian style.38 Trump’s openly expressed 
racism and sexism and his defaming of entire populations and the religion of Islam have further 
clouded the image of a potentially shining example of democratic leadership. Moreover, with very few 
exceptions, he and his team have avoided talking about democracy (promotion) and human rights 
whenever possible, most prominently in the recent National Security Strategy. These seemingly mi-
nor issues are far from irrelevant. Autocratic leaders as well as pro-democracy activists all over the 
world are reading the signs and are adjusting their behavior accordingly. Increasingly repressive gov-
ernments as diverse as Cambodia, Egypt, Honduras, and Hungary have felt emboldened by the new 
administration’s reservations in connection with democracy and have stepped up anti-democratic 
rhetoric and, in part, also anti-democratic measures.39
When making any predictions about US democracy promotion policy in the future, it is important 
to keep in mind that the president and cabinet is just one player among several in the US foreign 
policy elite. It is safe to say that US democracy promotion is unlikely to disappear from the world 
stage entirely, because of a deeply entrenched democracy promotion bureaucracy and many very 
committed individuals, among them top diplomats as well as a Congress which has in the past often 
pushed the administration in the direction of strengthening this policy.40 While presidential neglect 
and rhetorical sabotage are indeed damaging US democracy promotion efforts and should be taken 
seriously, it would take a much more concerted effort to purge the issue from US foreign policy. The 
White House, however, currently cares too little about democracy promotion and is too chaotic to 
form a clear strategy in either direction. In the light of this as well as the well-entrenched bureaucracy, 
for the time being “democracy promotion schemes continue on autopilot in many countries, shielded 
by multi-year budgets.”41
It is possible that the administration intends to reframe democracy promotion as a strategic tool 
against US “enemies,” thus using it to target hostile autocratic regimes in order to effect regime 
change.42 This would build on the current tendency to more or less openly use democracy promotion 
– if addressed at all – for the pursuance of hard interests, especially security and counterterrorism. 
The administration might yet revive this ‘radical’ and highly controversial dimension of President 
38  Steven Levitsky/Daniel Ziblatt 2016: “Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?” 16 December 2016, https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-to-democracy.html.
39  “Donald Trump’s Administration is Promoting Democracy and Human Rights”, 6 December 2017, https://www.econo-
mist.com/news/united-states/21732074-fortunately-he-has-yet-notice-donald-trumps-administration-promoting-de-
mocracy-and; Thomas Carothers 2017: “Democracy Promotion under Trump: What Has Been Lost? What Remains?”, 
6 September 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/democracy-promotion-under-trump-what-has-been-
lost-what-remains-pub-73021. 
40   See Carothers 2017 (footnote 39).
41   See the Economist (footnote 39).
42   Nicolas Bouchet 2017: “The Trump Administration and Democracy Promotion: Thinking about Regime Change?”, 
3 November 2017, http://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/trump-administration-democracy-promotion-think-
ing-regime-change/; Carothers 2017 (footnote 39).
22 EDP NETWORK
Bush’s Freedom Agenda.43 It is also noteworthy that, in specific instances, democracy and human 
rights are still being used as policy lever; for example and to the surprise of many observers, the 
Trump administration recently withheld a significant amount of promised foreign aid to Egypt, citing 
the country’s poor human rights record as one reason.44
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, this means that the champion of democracy has become a wobbly candidate. With top lev-
el rhetorical support basically nonexistent, it is unclear how well lower-level democracy promotion 
efforts can continue – but continue, in one form or another, they will. What does this probably mean 
for US democracy promotion policy as well as for international democracy promotion actors? Should 
the administration maintain its lack of interest in and even disdain for democracy promotion in gen-
eral, this would bode ill for US democracy promotion as we know it. That, however, may not be an 
exclusively negative development. Inasmuch as this policy can be regarded as mostly a farce anyway, 
it might be argued that the Trump administration is now at least closing the gap between “words” 
and “deeds” in this already much criticized policy area, and that US democracy promotion has done 
much harm anyway – in light of its narrow conception and often a-political/uncritical foundations. 
Revisiting these foundations and becoming more open to democracy’s diverse faces would certainly 
do the whole policy endeavor some good – but is not to be expected from the new administration 
and instead will have to come from more operational actors. Restoring US credibility and “living by 
example” as much as that is possible is certainly good advice. More importantly, the United States 
should refrain from too closely linking the policy to counterterrorism in general and avoid labeling any 
military action as democracy promotion in particular.
Other pro-democracy actors should become accustomed to the lack of vocal US government 
support – and, ideally, use this to their own advantage. There is a chance to fill the existing vacuum, 
ideally by offering less top-down, more genuinely demand-driven support. Currently, other state ac-
tors do not seem to be eager to fill this void. The future in this regard might indeed belong to smaller, 
non-governmental entities, perhaps even new organizational forms. A focus on low-key, small-scale 
efforts carried out in a cooperative manner seems to be the way forward. Should the United States 
indeed attempt to turn democracy promotion into a strategy against what it considers problematic 
authoritarian regimes, international actors should try to oppose that in order to avoid further harm 
to democracy promotion in general. In either case, pro-democratic actors need to realign, but the US 
should not take the vocal or visible lead.
43  Oz Hassan 2013: Constructing America’s Freedom Agenda for the Middle East. Democracy and Domination. Annika 
Elena Poppe 2017: Recalibrating the Interest-Values-Nexus. US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East, in: Orient, 
58: 2, 15–22.
44  See Carothers 2017 (footnote 39).
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7. DemoCraCy promotIon In the poSt-SovIet SpaCe
Solveig Richter
7.1 STATUS QUO 
Three developments are relevant when we look at the way democracy is currently (not) being pro-
moted in the post-soviet space, specifically in the six countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine45: Firstly, the contestation between the transatlantic community and Russia 
has escalated over the past five years, with Russia using a mixture of hard and soft power (often 
also called hybrid warfare) to increase its sphere of influence in the region. Some of the Eastern Eu-
ropean NATO and EU member states are pushing their organizations to have their security concerns 
addressed as well. This has almost resulted in open military confrontation, followed by EU sanctions 
against Russia and a loss of intermediary space of dialogue and soft power politics. We can also ob-
serve an increased level of polarization between and radicalization within the camps, as the heated 
debate about the deployment of NATO troops in the Baltic states demonstrates.
In line with this, secondly, the two major democracy promoters – the EU and the US – are less 
and less willing and able to pressure the countries into democratic reforms. The EU faces a severe 
loss of appeal due to internal crises, populism and backsliding tendencies in existing member states. 
This is weakening the EU’s normative coherence as a democracy promoter in the face of “alternative” 
forms of state authority which are being actively – directly or in subversive ways – promoted by Rus-
sia.46 A concrete example is the more confrontational stance the right-wing government in Poland, 
once one of the core drivers behind the EU’s Eastern Partnership, has adopted towards neighboring 
Ukraine.47 While major steps occurred in the European Neighborhood Policy (e.g. Association Agree-
ments (AA)/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
and visa liberalization with Georgia and with Ukraine in 2017 in addition to Moldova 2014), these were 
framed and implemented more as a technocratic than a political process.48 US foreign policy towards 
Russia is characterized by unpredictability and an emphasis on hard power instruments. US founda-
tions such as the Open Society Foundations which are engaged in human rights and civil society sup-
port are under pressure back home and in more established democracies in Central Europe such as 
Hungary, which diminishes their room for action in the post-soviet space as well. Another, more legal-
ly-oriented European democracy promoter, the Council of Europe, was shaken by corruption scandals 
with regard to Azerbaijan, which weakened its credibility enormously. 
45   Out of the 14 Non-Russian sovereign successor states of the Former Soviet Union, three countries have already 
joined the EU while the five Central Asian States form a distinct region and will thus not be covered by this article.
46   See Grimm in this report; on the “normative war“ with Russia, see Kadri Liik 2018: Winning the Normative War with 
Russia: An EU-Russia Power Audit, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, May 2018. 
47   See Kataryna Wolczuk 2017: Abandoning the Eastern Partnership Would Be a Terrible Act of Self-Harm for Poland, 
Chatham House, Expert Comment, 21 November 2017. 
48   See Balázs Jarábik 2017: Implementing the EU Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, Carne-
gie Endowment for International Peace, 16 November 2017. 
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Thirdly, on a more positive note, the region also offers some signs of hope – notably considerable, 
albeit fragile progress towards democracy in Georgia and in the non-occupied parts of Ukraine, and 
an active pro-democratic opposition which is promoting change in the shadow of big power politics, 
as we have recently seen in Armenia. New democracy promoters have emerged on the scene which 
are trying to promote an active democratization policy: The European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED) was created in 2012 as a private foundation that is seeking to operate with more flexibility than 
established governmental institutions. However, budgetary constraints are seriously inhibiting effec-
tive projects in the region.
7.2 CHALLENGES 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the post-soviet space has been an area of contestation between Rus-
sia and the West – both in geopolitical and in normative terms. Accordingly, democracy promotion 
has always been framed as an element of soft power politics by proponents such as the EU or the US 
and opponents such as Russia. Recently, however, the escalation of the geopolitical confrontation 
has brought hard power politics, e.g. military engagements, back to the headlines, further diminishing 
push and pull factors for democratization – whether these involve the interest of European capitals 
in democratic albeit risky transitions or their willingness to engage in lengthy deliberations in parlia-
ment in the face of security threats on the part of some post-soviet countries. 
In line with global trends, democratic backsliding and shrinking spaces are characteristic fea-
tures for political regimes in the area as well (see Gerschewski and Poppe/Wolff in this report). 
Freedom House categorizes three countries as having a ‘transitional government or hybrid regime’ 
(Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), one country as a ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian regime’ (Armenia) and 
two countries as ‘consolidated authoritarian regimes’ (Azerbaijan and Belarus). The 2018 report on 
Nations in Transit critically notes that “[a]ttacks on opposition parties, the press, and civil society or-
ganizations are becoming the norm […] as the spread of illiberal politics undermines the foundations 
and prospects for democracy.” Even in countries such as Ukraine, once considered a frontrunner, “the 
window of opportunity has not closed [...], but it has shrunk.”49 In addition, state capture is increasing-
ly dominating the public space – the infiltration of state institutions by entrenched clientele networks 
which are dominating decision-making processes of the country.50
A specific challenge in the region is the persistence of contested statehood: Five out of the six 
countries are involved in unresolved secession conflicts which are heavily influencing domestic poli-
tics and are a permanent source of confrontation between Russia and Europe. In consequence, large 
parts of the post-soviet space are governed by regimes which are not recognized by one of the main 
49   Freedom House 2018: Confronting Illiberalism: Nations in Transit Releases 2018 edition, 11 April 2018, https://free-
domhouse.org/article/confronting-illiberalism-nations-transit-releases-2018-edition (07/082018). 
50   Solveig Richter 2017: Der Wolf im Schafspelz: Illegitime Herrschaft durch ‚State Capture‘ in Nachkriegs- und Transi-
tionsgesellschaften, in: Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 6: 2, 174–206.
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external actors, making democracy promotion usually a secondary priority after conflict-manage-
ment or stabilization to fill the security vacuum.51
Thus, linking the regional political challenges to the policies of major European or transatlantic 
democracy promoters, we can clearly see a “securitization”: Democracy promotion as an instrument 
of soft power of the transatlantic community is increasingly being either sidelined by “hard power” 
politics (e.g., NATO, OSCE) or seen as an instrument for stabilization of the region instead of as a 
push for reform. As an example, in 2017 the EU adjusted the European Neighborhood Policy to “focus 
on stabilisation, resilience and security.”52 However, an academic consensus prevails that if democra-
cy promotion is sub-ordinated to or aligned with geopolitical interests, it will fall short of yielding any 
significant impact and will even have counterproductive side-effects.53
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
External actors have to accept that in the medium-term, they will have to face illiberal politics and 
closing spaces in the context of strong normative contestation with Russia.54 However, European 
states and the US still have a certain room for maneuver if they have the political will to support dem-
ocratic change. 
Firstly, in order to avoid further securitization of democracy promotion, less hard and more soft 
power should be applied: While it is important that security concerns are addressed within the trans-
atlantic community, they should be dealt with by NATO. Norm-based organizations such as the EU 
and the Council of Europe should give greater priority to soft power in their foreign policy actions. 
Secondly, and in line with this, governments following the democratic reform path need more 
incentives from the outside. The EU is the only organization having clear rewards in the form of a 
membership perspective which should be offered to countries making progress – despite Russian 
resistance. The case of Ukraine is crucial in this regard, since “both sides are showing signs of fa-
tigue”55 and it is necessary to keep the reform momentum in a key country where both Russia and 
the West are seeking influence. 
Thirdly, Europeans should acknowledge the fact that transition to democracy in the post-soviet 
space is not a lost cause, since change is still being demanded bottom-up, as specifically youth orga-
51   See Judy Dempsey 2017: Eastern Europe’s Yawning Gap, Carnegie Europe, 27 October 2017. 
52   See European Commission 2017: Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: supporting stabilisation, resilience, secu-
rity, Press Release, Brussels, 18 May 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1334_en.htm (07/08/2018). 
53   See Solveig Richter 2012: Two at One Blow? The EU and its Quest for Security and Democracy by Political Condition-
ality in the Western Balkans, in: Democratization, 19: 3, 507–534.
54   See Rosa Balfour/Nicolas Bouchet 2018: Supporting Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Old 
and New Challenges, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Policy Brief, 27 February 2018; and Liik 2018 
(footnote 46). 
55   See Jarábik 2017 (footnote 48). 
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nizations and nascent anti-corruption initiatives illustrate. Intergovernmental, top-down instruments 
of democracy promotion usually fall short of inducing change in the face of either autocrats or oli-
garchs.56 However, bottom-up instruments of civil society support alone often either involve merely 
technical assistance or put NGOs at risk (see Poppe/Wolff in this report). Only a combination of both 
– project support for pro-reform activists combined with political backing and vocal critics at the 
governmental level – might have a political impact. Flexible democracy promoters such as the EED 
which is keeping the flame of democratic reforms alive should receive more support as well.
8. DemoCraCy promotIon In the arab worlD 
Vera van Hüllen
8.1 STATUS QUO
Even beyond the Arab uprisings of 2011, authoritarian rule has proven remarkably persistent in the 
Arab world. So far, Tunisia is the only country that has successfully completed the initial stages of a 
democratic transition. Elsewhere, steps towards political liberalization have not (yet) been translat-
ed into regime change, and we even see de-liberalizing tendencies (see Gerschewski in this report) 
and shrinking civic spaces (see Poppe/Wolff in this report) in many parts of the region. In addition, a 
number of protracted violent conflicts – most notably in Libya, Syria, and Yemen – that are the source 
of humanitarian crises and regional instability reveal the relevance of power politics and strategic 
interests in conceiving and especially in implementing democracy promotion policies. The uprisings, 
on the one hand, highlighted the overall failure of previous international democracy promotion ef-
forts. On the other, they did not bring the democratic breakthrough that would have opened a window 
of opportunity for more legitimate and more effective democracy promotion efforts. Thus, it is not 
overly surprising that the initial enthusiasm of the main international democracy promoters in the 
region has quickly waned: The US rhetoric of disengagement from the region overshadows its ambi-
tion to promote democracy through its Middle East Partnership Initiative (see Poppe in this report) 
and the European Union’s revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2015 is silent on the 2011 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (see Grimm in this report). While the G7 are still 
engaged in the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition launched in 2011, they have 
silently pulled out of their earlier G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative with its 
emblematic Forum for the Future.57 
56   See Solveig Richter/Natasha Wunsch 2019: Money, Power, Glory: The Linkage between EU Conditionality and Domes-
tic Politics in the Western Balkans, forthcoming in: Journal of European Public Policy.
57   The Deauville Partnership supports economic and political reforms in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Yemen in cooperation with partners from regional and international financial institutions, not least through a newly 
created MENA Transition Fund. The last BMENA Initiative Forum for the Future took place in 2013 in Cairo and attract-
ed much criticism in light of the political situation in the host country.
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8.2 CHALLENGES
In the Arab world, the backlash against democracy promotion described in the introduction plays 
out in two ways. First, the credibility of international actors as champions of democracy and human 
rights has been severely compromised. Charges of hypocrisy and paternalism are strong and further 
reinforced as ‘Northwestern’ actors increasingly face undemocratic movements and developments 
‘at home.’ Second, democracy promoters in the Arab world are increasingly facing competition from 
other regional and international actors who promote alternative models of democratic or openly au-
thoritarian rule. Beyond Russia and China, these also include regional players such as Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey. As a result, both the norms and the way they are promoted are increasingly contested, 
and international actors can count less than ever on the ‘natural’ attractiveness of their policies to 
state and non-state actors in the region. 
In addition, violent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya are overshadowing international democ-
racy promotion in three ways. First of all, the concern for ending hostilities and initiating a peace 
process is eclipsing a narrower democracy promotion agenda for the moment. Second, the transna-
tionalized nature of these ‘civil wars’ reflects much deeper regional and global conflicts. The intra-re-
gional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Kurdish ques-
tion in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, as well as global tensions between the US, Russia, and Iran, are barriers 
to a more stable and peaceful regional order. Finally, the spillover of violence and the sheer number of 
refugees are directly destabilizing the political situation in many countries of the region and highlight 
other foreign policy interests that compete with the objective of promoting democracy. In particular 
the issue of migration has become a concern for European actors and is putting further strain on the 
idea of foreign policies consistent with normative ambitions, as illustrated by the EU-Turkey refugee 
deal of 2016 (see Grimm in this report).
Depending on specific conditions in individual countries, international actors face fundamen-
tally different challenges regarding their potential – positive as well as negative – impact. While 
a democratic transition opens a window of opportunity for external actors to successfully support 
endogenous dynamics of democratization in principle, the process of establishing and consolidating 
democratic institutions in Tunisia is fragile at best. Fragmentation, tensions, and protests mark the 
political process, put under stress not only by terrorist attacks and political violence but also by slow 
economic growth and increasing socio-economic grievances. These developments risk feeding into 
processes of radicalization and a broader disenchantment with democracy’s inability to deliver on the 
promise of ‘dignity,’ including both freedom and employment. Only by successfully – and democrati-
cally – addressing the current security and socio-economic challenges, will democratic consolidation 
stand a chance in Tunisia and make it an attractive model for other Arab countries.
Most countries in the region have remained under authoritarian rule, however, and thus continue 
to present the real ‘hard cases’ for international democracy promotion. On the one hand, in times of 
shrinking civic spaces (see Poppe/Wolff in this report) and open resistance to external attempts at 
democracy promotion, international actors often find it almost impossible to implement their mea-
sures, especially democracy assistance projects targeting civil society organizations. On the other 
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hand, past experience with the implementation of measures in cooperation with authoritarian re-
gimes suggests that democracy promotion efforts are, at best, ineffective or even counterproduc-
tive, and stabilize incumbent rulers.58 Steps in political liberalization are in most cases not a sign of 
substantive processes of democratization but part of authoritarian survival strategies.59 Measures 
designed to improve good governance can boost the regimes’ output legitimacy or even build their 
repressive capacities, a (potential) ‘downside’ of functional cooperation described by Freyburg in this 
report. Competing foreign policy interests in the fields of economic and security cooperation, rang-
ing from energy security to the management of migration flows, often curb the effective leverage of 
external actors and make political conditionalities both ineffective and an additional burden to their 
credibility. Furthermore, handing out rewards or withholding sanctions in contradiction of their own 
standards can create an impression of international approval of authoritarian practices where none 
is warranted.
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the maxim of being credible and, if nothing else, of doing no harm, international democracy 
promoters should clearly distinguish between countries that have already completed a democratic 
transition and authoritarian regimes that might or might not be engaged in processes of political lib-
eralization, and then design their policies accordingly.
While Tunisia presents, in principle, the most favorable context for international democracy pro-
motion efforts in the region, external actors still face a number of challenges regarding the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of their efforts. International democracy promoters at all levels (governments, non-
state actors/civil society) need to accompany the process of democratic consolidation in Tunisia in 
the long run without compromising its quality by heavy-handed interference. They should continue 
to generously offer their support in terms of expertise and resources, when requested to do so by 
Tunisia. In order to promote the emergence of a Tunisian democratic culture, they should seek to 
stimulate domestic contestation and deliberation in public debates and democratic decision-making 
in interaction with, but not dominated by external actors and ‘global’ norms. They should do so by 
raising questions and concerns, by suggesting options and alternatives, and by refraining from pro-
viding specific answers and ready-made solutions. In addition to the genuinely political side of this 
process, they need to pay attention to the broader economic, social, and security context of demo-
cratic consolidation and regard trade and investment policies as flanking measures. In particular, 
global institutions like the WTO and IMF need to make sure that the social implications of economic 
reforms do not jeopardize popular support for democracy.
58   Vera van Hüllen 2017: Resistance to International Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia, in: Third World The-
matics: A TWQ Journal 2: 5, 637–657.
59   Vera van Hüllen 2015: EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring. International Cooperation and Authoritarian-
ism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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By contrast, the room for maneuver in democracy promotion vis-à-vis the remaining authoritarian 
regimes in the region is much more limited. In order to restore the credibility of democracy promotion 
in authoritarian contexts, international actors need to self-critically address the dilemma of democ-
racy promotion and pragmatic cooperation with authoritarian regimes (see Freyburg in this report). 
Heeding the premise of ‘do no harm,’ democracy promoters should avoid increasing the repressive 
capacities of authoritarian rulers. Even more liberalized regimes like Morocco also used physical 
force to suppress protests in 2011, and the case of Egypt demonstrates how authoritarian regimes 
are increasingly using legal proceedings to persecute their opposition. If other strategic interests 
suggest support for security sector reforms, border management, or even modernization of the judi-
ciary, e.g. in Libya and other countries of transit, these activities should not be ‘sold’ under the label 
of democracy promotion. International actors should also avoid giving legitimacy to authoritarian 
rulers through their implicit or explicit recognition as democratic or democratizing, as they have fre-
quently done in the early stages of transition in Tunisia and Yemen, but also in seemingly liberalizing 
countries like Jordan and Morocco. Given the lack of success in helping to bring about reforms that 
substantively democratize authoritarian regimes, international actors should tone down their rhetoric 
and avoid pursuing policies that are easily unmasked as window dressing. Further, they should refrain 
from formulating political conditionalities if they lack the political will and/or capacity to consistently 
apply their own rewards and sanctions, which seems to be the case most of the time. In particular 
the EU and its member states have to find ways of reconciling their normative ambitions and strate-
gic interests in the ENP in order to avoid charges of both hypocrisy and complacency. Instead, inter-
national actors engaged in the Arab world should seek to promote spaces for democratization or at 
least broader political participation and open debates without shifting the balance of power in ways 
that do not reflect public opinion. Using both diplomatic tools and, if requested by the target regime, 
democracy assistance, they should support reforms in the legal framework of civil society, the media, 
and other spheres of political life and civic activism. The objective must be to level the playing field 
rather than to selectively support individual players. International actors should use more indirect 
ways of promoting fundamental norms and values conducive to pro-democratic mobilization through 
functional cooperation (see Freyburg in this report). Supporting the provision of public goods and 
services, such as health, education, or even water, can indeed entail experiences of impartiality and 
fairness for a broader public.
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9. DemoCraCy promotIon In afrICa
Julia Leininger
9.1 STATUS QUO60
Africa has one of the most elaborated regimes for protecting and promoting democracy worldwide. 
Inspired by the Organization of American States (see Wolff in this report), the Charter of the African 
Union (AU), adopted in 2000, includes a reference to the principles of democracy and human rights 
and established unconstitutional changes of government as a ground for suspension. Overall, at-
tempts to pro-actively promote democracy have remained limited, but on several occasions the AU 
has applied its norm against “unconstitutional changes of government” to either protect democrat-
ically elected governments against unconstitutional threats or to defend existing political regimes 
against incumbents’ unconstitutional attempts to extend presidential term limits. The same pattern 
holds for the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), which is the most active or-
ganization at the sub-regional level.61 While these strong regional norms have resulted in an increase 
in more reactive measures for protecting democratic institutions when their survival was at stake 
(e.g. military coups, third term attempts etc.), no regime to pro-actively support and promote democ-
racy is in place yet. Supporting democracy is still left to non-regional donors such as the US, the Eu-
ropean Union and its member states as well as international and non-governmental organizations.62 
Varying regional and non-regional efforts to protect and promote democracy mirror the different 
regime trends on the continent. Regular elections are held in most of the 54 countries, but only 19 
are generally considered to be democracies, while the others are electoral autocracies with limited 
civil rights, accountability and rule of law. However, at least when considering the size of the popula-
tions of individual countries and focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa, this is the only world region which 
experienced a slight increase in its level of democracy in 2017.63 In recent years, autocratic regimes 
unexpectedly opened up in the Gambia (2016), Zimbabwe (2017) and the second most populated 
African country, Ethiopia (2018). 
9.2 CHALLENGES
Democracy promotion in Africa faces a series of important challenges. The first concerns the well-
known issue of potentially competing foreign-policy interests. The two most prominent examples are 
60   This chapter largely focuses on democracy promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa. For more details on North Africa see 
van Hüllen in this report.
61   See Julia Leininger 2015: Against All Odds: Strong Democratic Norms in the African Union, in: Tanja A. Börzel/Vera 
van Hüllen (eds.): Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 51–67. 
62   Simone Dietrich/Joseph Wright 2015: Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa, in: The Jour-
nal of Politics 77: 1, 216–234.
63   See Lührmann et al. 2018 (footnote 10).
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security interests, and the current focus of the EU on reducing migration to Europe in response to the 
so-called refugee crisis. In addition, the prevalence of fragile statehood and violent conflict in a series 
of African countries has also led donor governments to prioritize state building and conflict manage-
ment over the more ambitious goal of democratic transformation.64
Second, changing regional and global geopolitics are weakening international alliances for de-
mocracy promotion in Africa. In recent years, African countries have diversified their political and 
economic relations and, as a result, have become less dependent on traditional donor countries from 
the OECD world. Such diversification concerns, in particular, China, but also India, Turkey, Japan and 
(to a lesser extent) Morocco. Although still important in terms of resources (trade, investment, aid) 
and bound by a joint colonial legacy, cooperation with European countries and the US has been re-
duced to becoming one among several pillars of Africa countries’ external relations.65 This has un-
dermined the potential for democracy promoters to push for democratic reforms through political 
conditionalities. 
Third, the normative competition for the “right” politico-economic model has increased during 
the last decade. For most parts of the period since 1990, debates on development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa have centered on the idea that good governance and democracy would lead to more societies 
that are prosperous. Yet, in recent years, democracy has lost appeal not only among African polit-
ical elites but also among increasing parts of the population. This trend has been nurtured by the 
slow progress in human development and persisting inequalities as well as elites’ rent-seeking and 
corruption that have persisted even in relatively democratic regimes. Despite continuing support for 
democracy as the most preferable political regime in many African countries,66 positive economic 
and social developments in a few authoritarian regimes such as Rwanda and Ethiopia have further 
strengthened a public discourse questioning democracy. Global dynamics also play a crucial role. 
International cooperation with economically successful authoritarian regimes, in particular China, in-
creases the appeal of authoritarian development models.67 China, in fact, has been offering political 
advice about the model of the authoritarian developmental state to some African governments, has 
opened culture institutes to engage with African societies and runs large programs of technological 
knowledge transfer. Democratic backsliding in the US and Europe has further undermined democracy 
as a model of development (see the introduction to this report). For instance, the European Union’s 
hesitant reaction to democratic backsliding in its member states and neighboring countries (e.g. 
Hungary, Poland, Turkey) lends inadvertent support to autocratic member states in African regional 
organizations which oppose AU democracy support. 
64   See Stephen Brown 2013: Democracy Promotion in Africa, in: Nic Cheeseman/David M. Anderson/Andrea Scheibler 
(eds.): Routledge Handbook of African Politics, London: Routledge, 404–13.
65   Sven Grimm/Christine Hackenesch 2017: China in Africa: What Challenges for a Reforming European Union Develop-
ment Policy? Illustrations from Country Cases, in: Development Policy Review 35: 4, 549–566.
66  See, for instance, the results of the Afrobarometer surveys of round 7.
67  Grimm/Hackenesch 2017 (footnote 65).
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Fourth, symbolic politics also matters. This not only concerns the negative signals that donor gov-
ernments send when applying double standards and/or prioritizing other foreign-policy goals over 
democratic norms. In this context, post-colonial politics are another example with immediate rele-
vance for democracy promotion. For instance, former colonial powers such as France and Germany 
have refused to return cultural goods which were stolen from African populations in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Although the French government currently seems to be re-positioning itself on 
this issue, the refusal of both countries to acknowledge their unethical behavior in the past has un-
dermined their credibility as democracy promoters. Why should African governments subscribe to 
the ‘democratic cause’ while donors defend their own autocratic behavior in the past? 
In addition to these specific challenges to democracy promotion, it is also important to consider 
a series of interrelated megatrends that are likely to fundamentally transform African societies during 
the next three decades.68 In terms of demographic change, the African population is expected to in-
crease to 2 billion people by 2050, with the majority being younger than 18 years. At the same time, 
urbanization will accelerate, with two thirds of the population living in cities by 2050. If the current 
trend continues without major changes, two thirds of urban citizens will live in slums. Both trends 
are likely to reinforce an ongoing third trend, namely an increase in local conflicts. These societal 
changes, on the one hand, provide the opportunity for stronger social mobilization for the common 
good and against exclusive politics. And, in fact, recent years have already seen social movements 
and grassroots organizations actively challenging exclusive African politics despite a shrinking civ-
ic space (see Poppe/Wolff in this report). On the other hand, low-intensity conflicts might increase 
further and escalate if the demands of the youth remain unaddressed and if no progress is made in 
building sustainable and inclusive cities. This means that, while democracy promotion can hardly 
stop or even reverse these megatrends, it can contribute to mitigating emerging conflicts.
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Strong democratic norms, African regional organizations, and different regime trajectories are the 
starting point for any effort to support democratization in African societies. In adjusting to the chal-
lenges just outlined, external democracy promoters should start by re-enforcing their recognition of 
the existing democratic norms they share with African partner governments and acknowledging the 
different regime trajectories on the continent. More specifically, I recommend the following: 
The problematique of competing interests requires a clear commitment to democratic norms 
without giving up other foreign policy interests. OECD donors cannot fall behind in their economic 
commitments to African governments, but they need to balance these commitments if they want to 
support democracy.
68  Julia Leininger 2018: The Many Paces of African Societies, in: Dirk Messner/Lutz Meyer (eds.) forthcoming: 2030 – 
Deutschland und die Welt, Berlin: ECON, 130–139.
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In the context of diversified external relations (geopolitics), democracy promotion must go be-
yond focusing on domestic political systems or the support of regional organizations. More dip-
lomatic action is needed to engage in a dialogue not only with African governments but also with 
other external partners of African governments. For instance, seeking an informal and confidential 
exchange about cooperation approaches in Africa with the governments of China, India or Morocco 
is a necessary condition for understanding the opportunities and challenges of democracy promo-
tion in Africa better.  
Normative doubts about democracy as the “right” politico-economic model for African societies 
can be countered through clear and open positioning of democracy promoters. Given the challenges 
to democracy within the OECD world, this is a task to be tackled first in donor societies themselves. 
Being open and transparent about the problems OECD democracies are facing is one entry point for 
changing the culture of cooperation between African and OECD governments. 
Democratic symbolic politics require that negative signals must be avoided. This includes the ex-
ample of stolen cultural goods which has clearly undermined the credibility of democracy promoters. 
Addressing spill-over effects of different sectoral policies is thus relevant for the success of democ-
racy promotion. 
Finally, addressing the implications of the different megatrends, calls for more integrated ap-
proaches by donors and multilateral organizations. If structural change is to be beneficial for the 
people, policies must be inclusive. Thus, sectoral approaches such as economic reforms or conflict 
management and crisis prevention must be more integrative with regard to democracy promotion 
(see Freyburg in this report). For instance, in order to avoid exclusive economic policies, any econom-
ic program should be accompanied by measures to support more inclusive political and economic 
institutions.
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10. DemoCraCy promotIon In the amerICaS
Jonas Wolff
10.1 STATUS QUO
The regional system of democracy promotion in the Americas is in serious trouble. Although the 
Western Hemisphere, still, consists almost entirely of democratic regimes and has one of the most 
advanced regimes of democracy and human rights protection world-wide, established institutions 
and practices are currently largely paralyzed. At the moment there are no regional actors – neither 
the former US hegemon, nor regional organizations or individual Latin American states – that have 
sufficient credibility, capacity and political will to respond to the serious challenges to, and in part 
open crises of, democracy that can be observed in the region. This paralysis is due to several factors, 
but a key problem is that, in today’s Americas, there is open disagreement about (1) what democracy 
actually means, (2) which activities of external democracy promotion are normatively appropriate 
and which not, and (3) who is entitled to engage in such activities to begin with.
The current situation reflects a process of normative disintegration and fragmentation which sig-
nals a clear turning away from the trajectory on which the region embarked in 1990. Enabled by the 
almost region-wide establishment of democratic regimes and the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw 
an emerging consensus that included a commitment to representative, liberal democracy as well 
as general agreement on the importance and legitimacy of external democracy promotion. At the 
level of the Organization of American States (OAS), this was reflected in a continuous strengthening 
of regional norms and instruments that provided for the protection and promotion of democracy in 
member states. This process of norm strengthening started in 1991 with the “Santiago Commitment 
to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System” and Resolution 1080 on “Representa-
tive Democracy,” and culminated in 2001 in the adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.69 
These institutional developments were accompanied by an expanding – if far from coherent and 
comprehensive – practice of collective responses to threats to democracy in the region. Even if far 
from coherent and comprehensive, such responses contributed to preventing or reversing breaches 
of the constitutional order in quite a few cases.70 In addition, bilateral policies of democracy promo-
tion expanded significantly – most importantly, on the part of the United States – and were generally 
welcomed, or at least accepted, by Latin American governments. While the OAS largely focused on 
the protection of democracy against outright domestic threats, US democracy promotion has been 
more actively engaged in shaping the very characteristics of democracy in the region. Additional 
democracy promoters in the region include the EU and individual European member states such as 
Germany or Spain. By and large, however, the role of these extra-regional actors is relatively minor in 
terms of both the economic resources they invest and the political leverage they can apply.
69   For an overview and key data and documents that are referred to here and later in the chapter, see Jorge Heine/
Brigitte Weiffen 2015: 21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas. Standing Up for the Policy, Abingdon: 
Routledge.
70   See Dexter S. Boniface 2007: The OAS’s Mixed Record, in: Thomas Legler/Sharon F. Lean/Dexter S. Boniface (eds.): 
Promoting Democracy in the Americas, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 40–62, 46. 
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10.2 CHALLENGES
The new struggle over democracy (promotion) that has characterized inter-American relations since 
the turn of the century has several dimensions and sources.71 First, with the election of a series of 
more of less leftist presidents across the region, several governments – including, most notably, in 
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador – started to promote conceptions of democracy that deliberately 
challenge the liberal model of democracy. More specifically, in the OAS, the regional consensus on 
“representative democracy” was now explicitly questioned in the name of “participatory” and “social/
ist” notions of democracy. These same governments also adopted a particularly critical stance vis-à-
vis US democracy promotion, which they regarded as neo-imperialist meddling aiming at the desta-
bilization of leftist governments. Second, and related, the US government under President George W. 
Bush did its best to delegitimize democracy promotion, most notably by equating democracy promo-
tion with military regime change (as in the case of the Iraq War) and by offering at least tacit support 
to the failed 2002 coup against Venezuela’s then president Hugo Chávez.
As a consequence, debates within the OAS have been characterized by severe normative dis-
agreements, which are intimately connected with conflicts of power and interest.72 This has contrib-
uted to the failure to find common inter-American responses to open threats to democracy in the 
region. In the case of the failed coup in Venezuela in 2002, a fairly accommodating US response un-
dermined the joint and swift Latin American condemnation of Chávez’s removal. Responding to the 
2009 coup in Honduras, the OAS initially unequivocally rejected the forced deposition of elected Pres-
ident Zelaya; but the longer the post-coup government remained in power, the more governments – 
including most prominently the US – veered away from this position. In other cases, in which elected 
presidents were removed in contested impeachment proceedings, such as in Paraguay (2012) and 
Brazil (2016), governments could not agree on whether what had happened meant a rupture of the 
constitutional order or not and, consequently, there was no common position or decision taken at the 
regional level. The same holds true for the gradual erosion of democracy in Venezuela. In the latter 
case, the OAS has continued to be paralyzed by the confrontation between Venezuela’s allies in the 
region, which systematically downplay the increasingly undeniable undermining of core democratic 
norms and institutions by the Maduro government on the one hand and the US government and its 
allies, in this case including OAS Secretary-General Almagro, which had taken an outright partisan 
approach well before Maduro openly undermined Venezuela’s democratic institutions, and has thus 
only contributed to further escalating the Venezuelan crisis. This is not to say that the OAS is entire-
ly paralyzed when it comes to democracy-related activities. When it comes to electoral observation 
missions, the OAS is in fact still serving a useful purpose – such as in the cases of contested elec-
tions in Ecuador and Honduras (both in 2017). In the latter case, however, individual states – and, 
once again, most notably the US – have undermined the OAS demand for a rerun election by recog-
nizing the re-election of president Juan Orlando Hernández.
71   See Jonas Wolff 2018: Democracy, in: Anne Tittor et al. (eds.): The Routledge Handbook to Political Economy and 
Governance in the Americas, London: Routledge, forthcoming.
72   See Andreas E. Feldmann 2015: Divisions at the Heart of Latin American Regional Democracy Efforts, http://carneg-
ieendowment.org/files/RDN_FeldmanN_03132015.pdf; Heine/Weiffen (footnote 69), chapters 4–6.
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In addition to ideological differences and related normative disagreements that obstruct collec-
tive regional responses to political crises, these very crises themselves also increasingly undermine 
international efforts at promoting and protecting democracy in the Americas. In the past, US de-
mocracy promotion was also contested, not least because of the history of US interference in the 
region that rarely followed pro-democracy norms. But with President Trump it is also the very state 
of democracy in the US itself that is under serious doubt, which has serious negative effects on the 
image of liberal democracy. This combines with a lack of political will when it comes to democracy 
promotion under the Trump administration, even if at the operational level many programs continue 
(see Poppe in this report).
During the years of the George W. Bush administration, the Latin American response to the loss of 
credibility on the part of the US was a focus on intra-Latin American relations. This was, for instance, 
reflected in the creation of regional organizations that competed with the OAS and were deliberately 
set up by Latin American states without US participation. The most important ones include the Union 
of South American Nations (UNASUR), established in 2008, and the Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in 2011. CELAC and UNASUR, in fact, established their own 
democracy clauses. And while CELAC never managed to become more than a forum for intra- and 
inter-regional dialogue, UNASUR initially developed an interesting dynamic – and, indeed, played a 
constructive role in a few domestic political crises (such as, for instance, in Bolivia in 2008). In ad-
dition, in the first decade of the new century, Brazil under the government of President Lula became 
an increasingly active regional power in terms of both foreign policy and development cooperation73 
that acted as a moderating force in quite a few intra-regional conflicts. With the election of conser-
vative president Mauricio Macri in Argentina (2015) and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in Brazil 
(2016), however, UNASUR is now just as divided and paralyzed as the OAS. And the interim govern-
ment of Michael Temer has all but abandoned Brazil’s strategic engagement with and in the region. 
Given the highly problematic impeachment of Rousseff, the Temer government’s poor domestic le-
gitimacy and the massive corruption scandals shaking Brazil, the country currently lacks both the 
capacity and the credibility to play a leading role in any efforts relating to promoting or protecting 
democracy in the region. These changes in both Brazil and the US (but also in several other countries 
in the region) are also reflected in a turning inward of political attention: at least when compared with 
their predecessors, current governments pay significantly less attention to regional affairs.
10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
There is currently no significant actor – neither a powerful government, nor a plausible alliance of 
governments, nor a regional organization – that is credible, willing and able to promote and/or pro-
tect democracy in the Americas. Polarization-cum-fragmentation significantly undermines the ca-
pacity of collective action at the regional level. No simple or immediate solutions to this problem are 
73   Here development cooperation is broadly understood to include Brazilian involvement through state institutions 
(such as the Brazilian development bank BNDES) and through private Brazilian companies (such as the by now noto-
rious Odebrecht). 
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available. When adjusting democracy promotion strategies to the difficult regional context, the above 
analysis suggests three overall recommendations:
In terms of actors: as long as official regional institutions are paralyzed when it comes to respons-
es to democratic crises, informal ad hoc coalitions of actors (states and non-state actors, such as 
elder statespersons) offer a better alternative (such as in the case of the ongoing mediation in the 
Venezuelan crisis). Within regional organizations, it would be helpful to enable open debates about 
the diverging views – so that they could at least serve as arenas for intra-regional debates.
When thinking about proper instruments, the focus at the moment should probably be less on 
promoting democracy in any ambitious sense but rather on conflict management and mediation, on 
the one hand, and electoral observation, on the other.
Finally, as concerns the thorny issue of norms: given the level of contestation of democratic 
norms, it might be useful to try to regain some regional consensus by focusing on fundamental 
basics of democratic rule. The task should not be to agree on what precisely democracy is, but on 
benchmarks that help identify clear-cut breaches of democratic rule.
These suggestions also apply to extra-regional actors such as the EU and individual European 
states, which have not been discussed in this chapter but whose democracy promotion policies do 
play a certain (if limited) role in the region. In general terms, these actors should focus on supporting 
political settlements both within and between the countries of the region, with a view to strengthen-
ing the intra-Latin American capacity to collectively promote and protect democracy.
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